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The Legal Process in Foreign Affairs:
Military Intervention-a Testing Case*
Thomas Ehrlicht
In the wake of the United States intervention in Cambodia in April
197o, Secretary of State Rogers sent a memorandum to his departmental
advisers urging that, "When crises occur in any area of the world, those in
the Department who are most directly involved should be careful to ensure
that the legal implications are not overlooked."' Secretary Rogers urged
particular care in situations involving the potential use of United States
armed forces. The memorandum was sent in response to criticisms, in Con-
gress and elsewhere, that legal advice had not been sought in advance of
United States ground action in Cambodia. The absence of any references
to legal issues in the published portions of the Pentagon Papers suggests
that the failure was not limited to the Cambodian affair.
This paper suggests procedures by which law may be brought to bear
on the process of deciding whether and how to use United States military
force short of full-scale war. Particular attention is focused on foreign civil
strife, for in the past-and predictably in the future-most decisions by our
government on whether to use force have involved such conflicts.2
This area of foreign policy is perhaps the most difficult for the legal pro-
cess. The reason for the difficulty is less the significance of decisions to
intervene than the character of the factors involved in the decisions. The
United States Government decision in 1968 to support trade preferences
for developing countries had a greater impact on our national interests-
however defined-than the 1965 decision to land troops in the Dominican
*Collaborative efforts with Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School and Professor
Andreas F. Lowenfeld of New York University School of Law stimulated many of the themes sug-
gested here. Particular thanks are due to Professor Lowenfeld and to my colleagues Professor John
Barton and Professor John Henry Merryman for helpful comments on the Essay in draft form.
Finally, I owe a special debt to Professor Alexander George of Stanford for his creative work on
decisionmaking in foreign affairs.
t- A.B. 1956, LL.B. 1959, Harvard University. Richard E. Lang Dean and Professor of Law, Stan-
ford University.
x. N.Y. Times, June 24, 197o, at 3, cols. 3-5.
2. By civil strife, I mean armed conflict in which the combatants are nationals of a single state.
The civil wars in France during the i8th century, in the United States during the 19th century, and
in Spain, the Congo, Nigeria, and Yemen during the last two decades are all examples.
In recent years, many scholars have tried to categorize various types of civil strife. In my view,
the framework proposed by Professor Richard Falk is particularly useful. See Falk, Introduction, in
THE IzR-aiArso-iAL LAw op Csv-m WAR (R. Falk ed. 197). These categorizations are needed to
analyze the legitimacy under international law of foreign interventions. For the purposes of this paper,
however, such a typology is unnecessary.
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Republic. But the factors relevant to intervention issues are both less mea-
surable and less rational than those involved in formulating trade policies.
Trade benefits and costs can be measured in ways that are not perceived as
possible when the question is whether to send in the marines.
Precisely because of this reality, crises that may lead to the use of force
provide a testing case for the legal process in decisionmaking on United
States foreign policy. If law and lawyers can have a significant impact in
this area, then other areas are a fortiori cases.
I
Although the Vietnam intervention is fresh in our minds, United States
military interventions in other lands have occurred mainly within Central
America and the Caribbean area. President Theodore Roosevelt issued his
famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904:
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the
ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require inter-
vention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence
of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, how-
ever reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exer-
cise of an international police power.
Within the next decades, United States marines landed in Cuba, the Do-
minican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. In each case, what began as a
temporary measure turned into a long-term occupation. In each case, United
States armed presence was deeply resented. To some Latin American eyes,
the United States had made the hemisphere safe from European interven-
tion to preserve the domain for its own.
The pattern of United States military actions that lasted until its replace-
ment by President Franklin Roosevelt's Good-Neighbor policy was gener-
ally consistent with traditional international law. Indeed, that pattern-and
the pattern of interventions by other Western countries-established the tra-
dition that made the law.
The standard learning8 is that a nation may aid, in any form it chooses,
a regime battling against an "insurgency," but aid to insurgents is precluded
as a violation of national sovereignty. Only when and if an insurgency de-
velops into a "belligerency" may a country grant recognition and assistance
to the rebels. But the factual premises and normative standards for deter-
mining belligerency have never been very clear, and the special nature of
recognition further confuses the matter. More troublesome, unilateral de-
terminations by intervening nations have been the rule. Countries that did
3. See, e.g., 2 L. OPPFN-iM, INTERNATIoNAL LAw § 298, at 66o (7th ed. 1952).
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not choose to participate in a conflict could remain neutral. Detailed codes
were developed in respect to shipping-where neutrals needed special pro-
tection.
The United States usually intervened on the side of the regime in
power prior to a civil strife. When this country acted on the side of the
rebels, a unilateral declaration of belligerency by the rebels could obviate
any problem. Even then, a few troublesome cases arose. Our 19o3 involve-
ment in Panama is an unhappy example.4
The legal norms with which the legitimacy of particular interventions
were traditionally debated are of little utility today. "Sovereignty," "recog-
nition," "insurgency," and "belligerency" were among the key standards.
None is of much help, for three interrelated reasons.
First, they appear subject to manipulation in the extreme; whether
they are in fact manipulated in any particular case may be less significant
than the appearance. A legal norm cannot have much impact if it is viewed
as verbal ammunition for either side in a dispute. The meaning of these
concepts is clear to some statesmen and scholars, but their clarity is confu-
sion in the eyes of others.
Second, the issues arise so seldom and in contexts so dissimilar that
little is possible in the way of reasoned elaboration. "Due process" inher-
ently is no less malleable a term than "sovereignty." But thousands of cases
before hundreds of courts have, over time, given substance to the phrase.
There are far fewer civil wars, fortunately, and the cultural, political, and
social settings are usually sharply different.
Finally, the bias of these concepts toward the status quo is so strong
that international law has not provided a modern framework for changing
the dimensions of legitimate international activity in this area. Such a
framework is essential.
By almost any test, the standard dogma of international law-that an
incumbent regime is the only legitimate recipient of assistance-is inade-
quate in the current world. The case against those traditional rules has
been made and remade with persuasiveness and eloquence.5 Yet I suspect
4. In March 1903, the legislature of Colombia rejected an agreement authorizing the United
States to construct an isthmian canal. The next month a group of Panamanian residents planned the
secession of Panama from Colombia, with at least the tacit support of the United States Government.
On October 9, 1903, United States warships were ordered to prevent Colombian troops from landing
in the event of a revolt. And on November 3, Secretary of State Iay cabled the United States Consul
in Panama: "Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep the Department fully informed." The Consul re-
plied: "No uprising yet. Reported it will be in the night." The revolution did begin that night and
succeeded within a few hours. The Republic of Panama declared its independence on November 4,
and the United States recognized the new nation 2 days later. By prearrangement, the Panamanian
regime immediately negotiated a new canal treaty that was more favorable to the United States than
the previous agreement. See S. MosusoN, ThE OxsoRa Hisroity OF = AI'tERcAN PEOPLE 825 (1965).
5. See, e.g., R. FALr, LEGAL ORDa IN A VOLETr WoVaLD 109-55 (I968); Farer, Harnessing
Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Intervention in Civil Strife, 83 HAtv. L. Rav. 511 (1969);
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that the strength of the rules is often underestimated. They are deeply
rooted in the psychology of leadership as well as in history. It is much
easier for a head of state to explain his government's aid to an existing and
therefore "legitimate" foreign regime than to defend aid to foreign insur-
gents.
The extent of acrimony in the seemingly endless debates of the United
Nations Committee on Friendly Relations must give pause to even the
most optimistic postulator of new rules. Whether the proposed norms are
uniformly endorsed, like "self-determination," or uniformly condemned,
like "intervention," the search for agreement on the meaning of such
terms has been tortuous. The General Assembly has passed a lengthy
resolution that includes a series of hortatory statements concerning the
impermissibility of foreign intervention in civil strife.' But the very argu-
ments over the meaning of that resolution, in and out of the General
Assembly, make it doubtful that the Assembly or any other United Na-
tions organ will produce agreed standards that are both general enough
to find broad acceptance and specific enough to have operational conse-
quences.
If agreed norms in this area emerge at all, I suspect they will evolve
through case-by-case developments within the broad rubric of Article 2(4)
of the United Nations Charter. Its terms provide: "All Members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
This prediction, if it is accurate, puts a great premium on the devel-
opment by individual nations of procedures for giving content over time,
on a case-by-case basis, to the broad prohibition in Article 2(4). Many
have commented that the prohibition is in danger of disregard whatever
the issue. Certainly this is true in the field of foreign intervention. Yet
new normative content can be developed in this area. It must be. What
procedures within our own government may be helpful in developing
that content ?
When decisions arise concerning potential United States military inter-
vention, the problems inherent in a centralized foreign policymaking pro-
cedure are accentuated. Policymakers generally have little difficulty in per-
Higgins, Internal War and International Law, in 3 Tim Ftrrua oF Tim INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OrdEt
81 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 197i).
6. G.A. Res. 2131, 2o U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at ii, U.N. Doc. A/6o, 4 (1965). After io years of
debate, the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression finally reached agreement on
the text of a draft definition. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1974, at 6, cols. 3-4. The draft marks an im-
portant step in developing international agreement on the meaning of "aggression." But its terms
inevitably will trigger controversies when applied to specific events. Unfortunately, no dispute-
settlement mechanisms are included in the draft to resolve those controversies.
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ceiving that an external event or development will damage United States
interests. The costs and risks to those interests usually are more apparent
than the costs and risks of preventive action. As a result, a consensus favor-
ing action may emerge prematurely. Perceived needs for secrecy and speed
generally mean that only a few advisers are involved.7 The customary
checks and balances at work in major decisions on domestic policy-Medi-
care, air pollution, and the like-are largely absent. Perhaps more critical,
no adversary process is at work to ensure full articulation of differing in-
terests and perspectives.
If nothing else is clear it should be that more lawyers in government
are not the solution. Some writers (including Dr. Kissinger before he was
in office) have suggested that lawyers are often part of the problem-that
the legal backgrounds of Secretaries Dulles, Rusk, and Rogers, and others
as well, have made them overly concerned with questions of "obligation,"
and "commitment," or at least overly willing to turn time-bound state-
ments of policy into permanent undertakings imbued with legal implica-
tions.8 But the issue here is not lawyers but legal arrangements.
Legal factors certainly should not be the sole determinant of policy-
making in any area of political importance, any more than military, eco-
nomic, or other factors ought to be the sole determinant. Legal issues
ought to be a part of the decisionmaking process, however, and I am con-
cerned because those issues seem to receive relatively short shrift, particu-
larly when military intervention is at issue. The case for that concern is
not hard to document. It was true in late 19th-century and early 20th-
century foreign policymaking by the United States Government toward
Latin America. It was true in the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis. It was
true in the 197o decision to send United States troops into Cambodia. It
was true in these and other instances because the existing international
norms were inadequate on their substantive merits and self-defining in
their procedural applications. Any nation can decide for itself when and
if a particular civil strife in some foreign land moves from a rebellion to
an insurgency to a belligerency. And there has been no machinery within
the United States Government to develop new standards adequate to a
new age.
I have no mechanical rabbits to suggest for meeting this challenge.
But I believe that important benefits will emerge from attention to ways
of promoting advocacy of divergent legal views among government and
private lawyers. These benefits are not exclusively related to military inter-
7. See generally Katzenbach, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Secrecy, 52 FoRE rN AFF. i
(1973).
8. See G. KENNAss, AmRCAN DIPLomACY 1900-I95o, at 96-ioo (195); Kissinger, The Viet
Nam Negotiations, 47 FomrliN AFF. 211, 222-23 (1969).
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vention, but they have "testing case" relevance in that context. Three lines
of approach seem most promising-within the executive; within the Con-
gress; and within the legal profession.
II
In recent years, a number of case studies have been published concern-
ing United States decisionmaking on whether to use force (and, if so, how
much force) abroad.' These studies compel the judgment, in my view, that
more and better arrangements are needed within the executive branch to
ensure what Professor Alexander George has called "multiple advocacy"
before the President and Secretary of State." Professor George presents a
persuasive case that effective and reasoned decisionmaking is more likely
to result when different perspectives are not blurred in the bureaucratic
process of preparing the foundation for a presidential decision. President
Roosevelt developed a staff of advisers on whom he could count to raise
opposing positions and to maintain those positions until the issue reached
his desk. The clashes between Harold Ickes and Harry Hopkins are a
prime example. Similarly, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson
stressed the extent to which President Truman encouraged different offi-
cials to bring their different views to him for resolution.1'
None of the existing formal arrangements in the executive branch is
designed to promote this sort of multiple advocacy concerning the legal
implications of United States military intervention. The Legal Adviser to
the State Department is responsible for considering those implications.
But he is also, and primarily, charged with being an advocate for the De-
partment-with defending, in legal terms, the Department's ultimate judg-
ment, whatever that may be.
Some have suggested a legal adviser on international affairs reporting
directly to the President. 2 Such an official would weigh the legal aspects of
alternative interventionary decisions in terms of developing a sound body
of international law. An alternative model, differing more in theory than
in practice from the first, calls for a kind of devil's advocate with a man-
9. See, e.g., R. Falk ed., supra note 2; W. KANE, CIVIL STRIFE IrN LATIN AmERicA: A LEoAL
HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT (1972).
xo. George, The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Ma ing Foregn Policy, 66 Af. POL. Set. RNv.
751 (1972). See also Destler, Comment: Multiple Advocacy: Some "Limits and Costs," 66 Am. POL.
Scr. RErv. 786 (1972); George, Rejoinder to "Comment" by I. M. Destler, 66 Aa . PoL. Scr. REv. 791
(1972)-
II. See D. Acsmsos, PRnsENT ATT I CREATION 733 (i969): "The President gives his hierarchical
blessing to platitudes. To perform his real duty must involve the anguish of decision, and to decide
one must know the real issues. These have to be found and flushed like birds from a field. The
adversary process is the best bird dog."
12. See Falk, Law, Lawyers, and the Conduct of American Foreign Relations, 78 YALE L.. 919,
933 (i969).
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date to establish an adversary proceeding on the legal implications of alter-
native proposals." This arrangement would ensure some debate on the law
involved in proposed actions. It would reduce the risks that the sharp cor-
ners of controversy would be smoothed off as proposals move up a bureau-
cratic ladder.
The arrangement would have major advantages, but its dangers are
obvious. Most important, a devil's advocate too easily could become just
that-an advocate of the devil, not a serious proponent of a serious position.
Others involved in a particular decision could listen to his arguments with
the comfortable knowledge that he was "only doing his job," and was not
to be taken seriously.
Another approach would be less mechanical but probably more effec-
tive. It would establish within the State Department not a formal mecha-
nism to promote debate from differing perspectives but rather a policy to
encourage it. The Legal Adviser would be called on, as a matter of pub-
licly announced policy, to ensure that advocates within-or, if necessary,
outside-his office developed the strongest possible legal arguments for
conflicting positions. In some situations, this adversary process might in-
volve only two sides; more often, a number of choices should be devel-
oped. I am fairly convinced that within a reasonably short time, a prac-
tice of preparing opposing legal briefs could become well-ingrained. The
value of such a practice could be substantial. It would promote reasoned
analysis of legal positions in a way that is unlikely without adversary
pressures.
The advantages of multiple-advocacy arrangements are not, of course,
limited to lawyers or to legal matters. International trade issues, for ex-
ample, can be sharpened and clarified by a clash of economists with differ-
ing views. The same is true of experts in other disciplines. Further, there
is often much to be gained-and little to be lost-from bringing together
practitioners in various fields. Coordination is needed to ensure that the
clash elucidates rather than clouds an issue. And this is often difficult. But
the benefits can be substantial.
Without minimizing the importance of other substantive perspectives,
I focus here on law both because it seems to me relatively neglected in for-
eign policy and because the procedures for ensuring multiple advocacy are
themselves part of the legal process in national decisionmaking on foreign
affairs.
As Professor George recognizes, the design of multiple-advocacy ar-
13. Some have suggested that Undersecretary of State George W. Ball played this role (although
not directly regarding legal issues) in the mid-xg6o's debates on United States policy regarding
Southeast Asia. See D. HaLBrsrs, TrE Besr AND TnE BRIGHTEsr 491-99 (1972).
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rangements can raise formidable bureaucratic problems, especially at ad-
ministrative levels below that of the Presidential staff. In terms of pro-
cedure, the Legal Adviser would need an assistant to coordinate the advo-
cacy-one with adequate leverage to ensure balanced analysis. In terms of
substance, those involved would have to resist the temptation to limit de-
bate to two positions. But I believe that these and other problems could be
overcome and that the results would be more than worth the effort.
The arguments advanced by the Legal Adviser in support of the 1965
Dominican intervention illustrate the dangers of an ex cathedra approach.
In April 1965, a military coup overthrew the regime of President Reid Ca-
bral. Almost immediately, the United States landed its troops. The State
Department initially defended the intervention on the ground that the
troops were necessary to protect the lives of United States and other for-
eign nationals. Rather quickly, however, the stated rationale shifted to a
claim that the United States action was necessary to forestall a Communist
takeover. The Legal Adviser's Office was not substantially involved or con-
sulted either before the intervention or immediately thereafter. It was not
until May 5, 1965-more than a week after the landing of American ma-
rines-that the Legal Adviser released a brief on The Legal Basis for U.S.
Actions in the Dominican Republic 4 The opinion was prepared because
of intense pressure from outside the executive branch, particularly within
Congress, for some statement about the law of the matter.
In my view, the Dominican intervention was a tragic mistake. But even
after the United States decision to use force, much might have been done
by lawyers. If the opportunity had been available for the Legal Adviser's
Office to prepare opposing legal arguments-to take advantage of the clash
of opinions-before or during the crisis, I have no doubt that the most
persuasive case in support of intervention would have been framed exclu-
sively in terms of protecting United States citizens and, perhaps, foreign
nationals, much as was done in the Congo rescue operation1 One can
question whether the United States should ever intervene militarily to save
its own citizens on foreign shores, but there is substantial support for such
action in traditional international law. A publicly announced legal posi-
tion along this line might have put some brake on United States involve-
ment in succeeding days, when it became dear that United States citizens
and other non-Dominicans were safe. A policy to ensure a clash of oppos-
ing legal positions would almost certainly have produced that result.
The actual opinion of the Legal Adviser seems to conclude that uni-
14. See Dep't of State, Memorandum: Legal Basis for U.S. Actions in the Dominican Republic,
in iii CONG. Ruc. xxx19 (1965). The final version was revised on May 7, to take into account the
May 6 resolution of the OAS.
x5. See Ehrlich, The Measuring Line of Occasion, 3 STAN. J. INT'L STMMS 27,35 (1968).
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lateral military intervention is appropriate whenever any one of three cir-
cumstances exists-whenever nationals of any foreign country are in dan-
ger; whenever it is possible that a regional organization might act; and
whenever Communists are involved. I have suggested elsewhere a legal
analysis that, in my view, would have been more persuasive and would
have created a narrower precedent." My point here is that if the legal
arguments put forth to defend the action had been subject to adversary
debate before the event, the intervention might not have occurred; or-
if it had-the precedent could have been sharply narrowed. Such bad law-
yering weakens not only the position of the United States in world affairs,
but the position of international law as well.
Another unhappy illustration of the same point is a memorandum
issued by the Secretary of State on May I, 1973, in defense of continued
United States bombing of Cambodia," notwithstanding the cease-fire agree-
ment negotiated with North Vietnam 3 months earlier." Article 2o of
that agreement calls for the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from
Cambodia. The air strikes on Cambodia represented, according to the
memorandum, "a meaningful interim action to bring about compliance
with this critical provision in the Vietnam agreement."
The opinion was released only after intense pressures by the Congress
for some executive branch legal analysis of the air strikes. In prior weeks,
justification by the State Department had been demanded, but the Depart-
ment had refused. Finally, the opinion was issued. In this case, I know of
no sound way in which the United States' actions could be defended in
law. The argument that one nation's alleged violation of its commitment
provides legal support for bombing another country cannot withstand
analysis in international law. The opinion was widely viewed by legal
scholars as well as by Congressmen as unpersuasive.
The very fact that no credible legal case could be made for the United
States actions may have helped to convince some Congressmen that the
bombing should be halted-even though cessation required a step by Con-
gress that had never previously been taken." If the Legal Adviser's Office
had been required much earlier to state publicly the basis in law for the
United States action-to prepare a kind of legal prospectus-the action
16. id. at 36.
17. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at io, cols. 3-8.
is. The cease-fire agreement is printed in 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 169 (i973).
19. See Second Supplemental Appropriations Act § 307, 87 Stat. 99 (1973): "None of the funds
herein appropriated under this Act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities
in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos,
North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other
funds heretofore appropriated under any other Act may be expended for such purpose." The Act was
passed and signed by President Nixon after his veto of a version calling for an immediate cutoff of
funds was sustained. See 1973 U.S. CoD CoNr. & AD. NEws 1985 (President's veto message).
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might have been avoided or terminated sooner. At the least, it would have
been subject to more searching legal analysis than actually occurred.
By contrast, the Cuban missile crisis illustrates the advantages of affirm-
ative efforts to explore various approaches to particular legal issues.2" It
shows the substantial role that law and lawyers can have in even the most
volatile emergency if a multiple-advocacy process is encouraged. Over the
course of the i3-day period in which competing strategies were debated
within the President's advisory group on the crisis-a group that included
a number of lawyers-conflicting legal positions were reviewed as part of
the design of competing "scenarios." Those positions ranged from that of
Dean Acheson, who said that international law is essentially irrelevant at
the time of such crisis, to that of Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach,
who claimed that either an air strike or blockade could be supported under
international law as self-defense, to that of Acting Legal Adviser Meeker,
who argued that the only use of force justifiable in law was a quarantine,
and further that a quarantine was valid only if backed by the Organization
of American States. 1
The point here is the value of multiple advocacy of opposing views.
The details of various arrangements to promote such advocacy are less
significant than that some arrangements exist. Indeed the advantages may
be maximized when a number of different arrangements are used.2"
III
It is, in my view, even more important that new governmental arrange-
ments be encouraged outside the executive branch. As a practical matter,
this means legislative arrangements, since there is little likelihood of sub-
stantial involvement by the judiciary. Courts were asked to pass on legal
issues involving United States participation in the Vietnam War, but they
consistently refused. On grounds of either lack of standing or the "politi-
cal question" doctrine, the courts stopped short of considering the consti-
tutional legitimacy of the war in the absence of a specific declaration of
20. See A. CRATES, THiE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1974).
21. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson went even further and advocated removal of the United
States missiles from Turkey and Greece, though published accounts are unclear whether he made that
case as a matter of law or of politics.
22. Currently, public debate on intervention issues sometimes can be generated, but only with
difficulty and usually well after the decision has been made. When the United States mined the
harbor of Haiphong in the spring of 1972, one of my colleagues and I wrote to the State Department
Legal Adviser questioning the action on grounds of international law. The Legal Adviser responded,
and excerpts from his response were ultimately published. 66 Ams. T. INT'L L. 836 (x972). Subse-
quently, both our initial letter and a rejoinder were also published. 67 Ams. J. INT'L L. 325 (1972).
Taken together, the letter, response, and rejoinder focus and frame some of the key legal issues involved
in considering the legitimacy of the United States action. Regardless of how one resolves the legal
questions, most will agree that the arguments ought to have been exposed to public scrutiny, and much
more quickly than was actually the case. But it took some effort to ensure that our initial letter and
rejoinder to the Legal Adviser's response were also published.
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war by Congress. There are some signs that this practice may have weak-
ened. The order by a federal district court in August 1973 to halt United
States bombing in Cambodia is a significant example, though that order
was reversed on appeal.!'
Still, a number of important factors militate against a significant im-
pact by the judiciary on the process of policymaking in international affairs.
Concerning decisions involving the potential use of force, perhaps the most
important factor is timing. Even assuming a willingness on the part of a
court to review the legality of a military intervention, such review will
almost certainly come only after, rather than before, the fact. Declaratory
judgments are unlikely. Further, the restraints on judicial involvement in
this area, developed under the "political question" rubric, make it un-
likely-and many say improper-for a court to consider the constitutional
issues raised by these cases. Congress is, therefore, the only governmental
possibility, apart from the executive branch, for guidance on questions
concerning military intervention.
In the wake of American involvement in Southeast Asia, a great deal
of controversy has been focused on the meaning and implications of the
constitutional provision that Congress alone may "declare war." Rather
than reexamine that controversy, I turn to what seems to me a pressing
requirement: that Congress widen and sharpen the debate on what the
international law is and what it should be relative to any particular situ-
ation that may involve United States military intervention. Whatever ar-
rangements are designed to encourage multiple advocacy within the exec-
utive branch, it is probable that most decisions on intervention will not be
subject to a full adversary debate in that forum. But if the Congress is
given the facts of a situation, and allowed some time to consider them,
such debate is much more likely.
In November 1973 the Congress adopted-over the President's veto-
a joint resolution "Concerning the War Powers of the President and Con-
gress." It is designed to limit the circumstances in which the President
may deploy United States armed forces in foreign hostilities without legis-
lative sanction. This was the latest round in a series of efforts begun in the
i96o's to provide statutory limits on the deployment of United States armed
forces by the President in the absence of congressional authorization. The
23. The district court's ruling is found in two separate opinions: Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.) (standing) and Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.)
(justiciability), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding dispute political question and non-
justiciable), vacation of circuit order refused, 414 U.S. 1307 (Marshall, Circuit justice), circuit order
vacated, 414 U.S. 1316 (Douglas, Circuit Justice), district order stayed, 414 U.S. 1321 (i973) (Mar-
shall, Circuit Justice). See also Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.), withdrawn by Order of
Court, 476 F.2d XrIII (1973).
24. H.R.J. R,. 542, 93 d Cong., ist Sess., z19 CoNcG. REc. 170 (1973).
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resolution was a compromise between the differing views of many in and
out of Congress. President Nixon stated in his veto message that two key
provisions in the resolution were "clearly unconstitutional." 5 More than
two-thirds of the Congress disagreed. The current status of those provi-
sions is thus unclear. The constitutionality and wisdom of their terms have
been argued and reargued at length. But another provision in the resolu-
tion-section 4--has particular relevance here, although it received little
attention in the public debates, and no one questions its constitutionality.
Within 48 hours after deploying United States armed forces in foreign
hostilities, the President is required to submit a report on the circum-
stances and justifications of the intervention, including a legal analysis.
No one can expect preparation of a carefully reasoned, fully developed
legal brief within 2 days after a decision to use military force. But pre-
cisely for that reason, the requirement can have several useful effects.
First, a reporting requirement will press government lawyers to ex-
amine the legal ramifications of possible alternative courses of action in ad-
vance of a crisis. International conflicts have occasionally occurred in which
the United States could not have foreseen the likelihood of military action.
But such situations are relatively rare. In most cases that have involved
actual or potential uses of United States military force, policy planners had
some warning; prior legal analysis would have been possible, had lawyers
been consulted, just as there was contingency planning by the military and
the State Department desk officers in these situations.
Second, and closely related, as a crisis develops the reporting require-
ment will encourage the President and his political and military advisers to
involve lawyers in the process of determining whether and when to use
force-and how much force to use. The need for legal justification to sup-
port the decision will be a strong incentive for analysis of legal considera-
tions as part of the overall decisionmaking process.
The Cuban missile crisis erupted suddenly, for example, but lawyers in
the State and Defense Departments had previously worked through the
basic legal considerations. The presence of Soviet missiles had not been
considered likely by the executive branch, but the possibility that some
set of circumstances might warrant United States intervention had been
25. Message from President Nixon to the House of Representatives, Oct. 23, 1973, 1973 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & AD. Naws 3808. One of the two provisions requires withdrawal of United States
forces from foreign hostilities within 6o to 90 days unless the Congress authorizes an extension. The
other requires such a withdrawal immediately upon passage of a concurrent resolution by Congress.
The veto message stated that both provisions are unconstitutional, that the Constitution can be
altered only by amendment, and that "any attempt to make such alterations by legislation is dearly
without force." President Nixon implied, therefore, that he would ignore the provisions should a
situation arise in which their terms are applicable. When the resolution was adopted over the Presi-
dent's veto, however, the White House refused to state whether it would obey the statute in those
or any other circumstances. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1973, at z, col. 8. The resolution does include
a severability provision.
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foreseen. As a result, preliminary legal analyses were prepared covering
some of the key issues. The Legal Adviser's Office in the State Department
published the basic legal justification of the quarantine within 12 hours
after it was announced." On the whole, that justification withstood scru-
tiny in the period that followed. But it could not have been written in half
a day without careful preparatory work.
Even in the unexpected explosion of the 1973 Middle East War-when
prior warnings were not available-lawyers could and should have been
engaged during the war in the process of examining alternative peacekeep-
ing arrangements. Yet, from all accounts, State Department lawyers were
isolated from policymaking in the matter'
It is true, of course, that if a President's lawyers are only clever but not
wise, they can verbalize legal justifications without substantive legal con-
tent. Perhaps the reporting provision in the "war powers" resolution is
better viewed, therefore, as an opportunity rather than a requirement. But
it should, at the least, pressure a President and his advisers to articulate a
legal basis for United States intervention and to think through that basis
in advance.
It is sometimes suggested that postevent justifications are worth little.
But this view misses a fundamental reality of policymaking.
[T]he requirement of justification suffuses the basic process of choice. There is
continuous feedback between the knowledge that the government will be called
upon to justify its action and the kind of action that can be chosen. The linkage
tends to induce a tolerable congruence between the actual corporate decision-
process, with its interplay of personal, bureaucratic, and political factors, and the
idealized picture of rational choice on the basis of objectively coherent criteria.
We may grant a considerable latitude for evasion and manipulation. But to ignore
the requirement of justification too long or to violate its canons too egregiously
creates, in a democracy, what we have come to call a "credibility gap." The ulti-
mate consequence is to erode the capacity of the government to govern.28
Even if one concludes-erroneously, I believe-that the legal analyses
required under the "war powers" resolution will have little impact on
decisionmaking within the executive branch, they should still focus inter-
vention issues within a framework that promotes public debate. One can
expect the arguments to be rebutted and executive branch lawyers to re-
26. See Dep't of State, Memorandum: Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba, in A. CHAEs,
T. Em cH, & A. LOWE4FELD, INrERNATioNAL LEGAL PROCEss, Doe. Supp. 552-58 (1968).
27. After Dr. Kissinger became Secretary of State, he appointed his personal lawyer, Carlyle
Maw, as the Department's Legal Adviser. In spite of Dr. Kissinger's previously disparaging view of
the role of lawyers in foreign affairs, see note 8 supra and accompanying text, Mr. Maw accompanied
the Secretary during most of his "shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East, and apparently had a more
significant role in peacemaking than had any Legal Adviser since Herman Phleger, who held that
office when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State.
28. A. OCrnEs, supra note 20, at xo3.
February 1975]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
spond to the rebuttals. The process should produce far more informed
analysis of policy issues in their legal dimensions than now occurs.
The resolution does not, by its terms, require congressional involve-
ment in the analysis of intervention issues before-as opposed to after-
United States troops are engaged in foreign hostilities. But for the reasons
I have indicated the reporting requirement in the resolution should make
such involvement more likely. No one can be sure, of course, how much
legislative impact participation would have in any particular case. A les-
son from the Indochina War of two decades ago, however, suggests that
the impact can be substantial.
Until 1954, all Indochina was a French colonial possession. But in the
spring of that year, a bloody civil war was taking place within Vietnam.
On March 20, the French Chief of Staff arrived in Washington with a
message that Indochina would fall unless the United States intervened.
France sought United States military action to turn the tide. Strong sup-
port for American intervention came from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford. He viewed the potential fall of Vietnam
as a first step toward the loss of Indochina and ultimately all of Southeast
Asia. It was essential, he argued, that what was later called the first domino
not be allowed to fall. The French forces in Vietnam would have to be
buttressed by the United States.
Admiral Radford prepared a detailed plan of military action to aid the
French. President Eisenhower called on Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles and Admiral Radford to meet with eight congressional leaders-
five senators and three representatives-to review the intervention plan.
The meeting was held on April 3, 1954. Radford presented his scheme and
Dulles endorsed it.20
But the congressional leaders unanimously opposed United States in-
tervention. All agreed that the unilateral use of force by the United States
would be a disaster. They insisted on a multilateral effort if any effort
were to be made at all. Although the arguments were probably rooted pri-
marily in political considerations, they might well have been framed in
legal terms. Certainly the Congressmen were influenced by the multilateral
support through the United Nations of the United States intervention in
Korea.
There are some ironies in the whole affair, particularly that Senator
29. One recent analysis claims that Dulles really wanted to scuttle the Radford plan. See R.
RANDLE, GENEvA 1954, 63-65 (1969). According to this theory, Dulles arranged the meeting with
legislative leaders to prove to the United States military establishment that Congress would not permit
United States intervention. This effort to make Dulles appear less of a hawk, but more of a Machiavelli,
seems implausible in light of other reports of his stated support for an American use of force. Most
accounts conclude that Dulles supported the Radford plan because he saw it as essential to check a
Communist chain reaction through Indochina. See George, The Case for Multiple .dvocacy in Maling
Foreign Policy, supra note 1o, at 771 n.67.
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Lyndon B. Johnson was one of the most vocal opponents of the plan.
April 3, 1954, has been called "The Day We Didn't Go to War""0 by
Chalmers M. Roberts. Others have suggested that Mr. Roberts over-drama-
tized the confrontation with congressional leaders. But no one disputes
that key figures in the executive branch were prepared to intervene and
that a handful of Congressmen raised a series of counterarguments that
the President found compelling. In my own view, the decision not to
intervene in Indochina was correct, at least if one divorces that decision
from the events of a decade later. Even if one disputes that verdict, I
think it hard to dissent from the proposition that congressional judgment
brought a valuable dimension to the decisionmaking process.3
Contrast the process of decisionmaking in April 1954 with the process
in March 1969 when the United States began to bomb Cambodia. For 13
months the intervention remained a secret from the public and from most
of Congress. The President obviously knew about the massive bombings,
yet in April 197o he claimed that the United States invasion at that time
was the first involvement by the American military in Cambodia. Pre-
sumably, many in the State Department were wholly unaware of the
United States' actions during the I3-month period. The State Department
Legal Adviser stated in May 197o before a bar association meeting that
the United States had not intervened until the previous month.3 2 It might
be that most in Congress would have approved the bombing of Cambodia
if it had been announced publicly in the spring of 1969. It is conceivable
that a sound legal case for the bombing could have been presented and
that the case would have been accepted by Congress as by the President.
But the opportunity never came. As a result, the kind of countervailing
congressional pressures that prevailed in 1954 never had a chance to be
expressed.
The persuasive legal case that the United States made for the quaran-
tine during the Cuban missile crisis was premised in major measure on
the operation of multilateral as opposed to unilateral decisionmaking pro-
cesses. The quarantine would be authorized by a regional arrangement, the
Organization of American States, acting under a multilateral agreement,
the Rio Treaty. It appears that in 1954 the congressional leaders advocated
a similar collective approach if any action were to occur. I do not suggest
that they argued primarily on the law. Whether or not the Congressmen
pressed their case in terms of law, morality, or practical politics is less sig-
30. Roberts, The Day We Didn't Go to War, ii Ts-- REPORTER, Sept. 14, 1954, at 31. See also
R. RANDLE, supra note 29, at 63-65.
31. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, also opposed the plan, and his arguments
were an important factor in the ultimate decision not to intervene.
32. Stevenson, United States Military Actions in Cambodia: Questions of International Law,
62 DEP'T STAm BULL. 765 (1970).
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nificant than that the President found it important to seek their counsel.
Too often in the recent past there have been inadequate opportunities
for such advice to be given. The "war powers" resolution is an important
step forward. It underscores the desires of Congress for involvement in
decisionmaking. The resolution may be a sufficient catalyst to promote con-
gressional consultation before as well as after an intervention decision. Only
experience will tell.
IV
Finally, I think that members of the legal profession have an oppor-
tunity and an obligation in this field. Unfortunately, in the realm of inter-
national law, the organized bar in general and the American Bar Associ-
ation in particular are best known for their stands against American in-
volvement in international arrangements-the Genocide Convention is a
prime example. On the rare occasions when the bar in the United States
has focused its attention on matters of international law, its leaders have
generally been content to confine themselves to platitudes favoring world
peace through world law.
An opportunity exists to do much more-to organize and promote fo-
cused debate on legal issues involving particular military interventions.
Some legal institutions-local bar associations and law schools-meet this
responsibility. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, through
the Hammarskj6ld Forum, is a prime example. But sadly, such institutions
are rare. One should not expect resolutions on the merits of intervention
issues. But it is reasonable to expect that those institutions seek out quali-
fied advocates for opposing positions and press them to present their views.
Insight and understanding will emerge in the dash of opinions.
"We must not make a scarecrow of the law," wrote Shakespeare in
Measure for Measure, "setting it up to fear the birds of prey, and let it
keep one shape till custom make it their perch, and not their terror." 3 For
too long, the international law on foreign intervention has kept one shape;
now there is little left but rhetoric. It is up to all of us in the legal profes-
sion to engage in the creative process of designing a new shape. In this
area of law, more than others, process is substance. Creative procedures
are needed to ensure reasoned deliberations on any actual or proposed new
interventions. Lawyers can and should contribute to those procedures and
deliberations.
33. Act II, scene i.
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